Baldwin v. Sebelius - Brief for Appellants by Baldwin, Steve
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation Research Projects and Empirical Data
11-24-2010
Baldwin v. Sebelius - Brief for Appellants
Steve Baldwin
Pacific Justice Institute
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
This Appellant Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
Baldwin, Steve, "Baldwin v. Sebelius - Brief for Appellants" (2010). Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation. Paper 59.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/59
No. 10-56374
In The
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEVE BALDWIN and PACIFIC JUSTICE INSTITUTE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
No. 10-cv-01033-DMS (SABRAW, J.)
_____
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
PETER D. LEPISCOPO, C.S.B. #139583
COUNSEL OF RECORD
WILLIAM P. MORROW, C.S.B. #140772
MICHAEL W. HEALY, C.L.S. #21880
JEREMIAH NEWCOMB, C.L.S. # 23267
JEREMY M. EVANS, C.L.S. #24211
BRADEN BOHLINGER, C.L.S. #26009
LEPISCOPO & MORROW, LLP
2635 CAMINO DEL RIO SOUTH, SUITE 109
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92108
TELEPHONE: (619) 299-5343
FACSIMILE: (619) 299-4767
e-mail: plepiscopo@att.net
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS STEVE BALDWIN AND
PACIFIC JUSTICE INSTITUTE
NOVEMBER 24, 2010
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 1 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
iCORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1, Plaintiff-Appellant
Pacific Justice Institute states that it is a non-profit religious organization with no
parent corporation, and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its
stock. Pacific Justice is a public interest and an education and legal defense
organization.
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 2 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……………………………………………….1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW………………………..1
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………...…..2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS…………………………………………………...4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE…………………………………………………….8
CASES IN OTHER CIRCUITS CHALLENGING THE ACT…………………...10
1. FOURTH CIRCUIT: THE VIRGINIA CASE……………………………………..10
2. SIXTH CIRCUIT: THE MICHIGAN CASE…………………………………..…. 12
3. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: THE FLORIDA CASE…………………………………...14
SUMMARY OF HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION…………………………..….17
1. CONGRESS MANDATES STATES TO CREATE HEALTH
EXCHANGES…………………………………………………………….…..17
2. THE “INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD”……………………..….….18
3. THE WORKING GROUP ON HEALTH CARE QUALITY…………………….......19
4. THE NATIONAL PREVENTION, HEALTH PROMOTION, AND
PUBLIC HEALTH COUNCIL………………………………………..………....20
5. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INSERTS ITSELF INTO LOCAL
COMMUNITIES—“CREATING HEALTHIER
COMMUNITIES”……………………………………………….…………..…21
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 3 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Cont.
Page(s)
6. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S CONTROL OVER RESTAURANTS,
RETAIL FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS, AND VENDING
MACHINES………………………………………………………..………....22
7. GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED HEALTH CARE
WORKFORCE…..............................................................................................23
8. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………..………...24
STANDARD OF REVIEW……………………………………………………….24
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT………………………………………………..….25
ARGUMENT…………………………………………………………………...…40
I. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLARE THE
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND ENJOIN ITS ENFORCEMENT BECAUSE
ITS ENACTMENT WAS NOT A PROPER
EXERCISE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE…………………………….40
II. THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT BALDWIN AND
PACIFIC JUSTICE’S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
TO THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE PROVISION IS
JUSTICIABLE UNDER ARTICLE III …………………………….51
A. STANDING…………………………………………………...……51
1. BALDWIN AND PACIFIC JUSTICE HAVE PLED
APPROPRIATELY TO SHOW INJURY AS GENERAL
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF INJURY ARE
ENOUGH IN A MOTION TO DISMISS………..………………53
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 4 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Cont.
Page(s)
2. THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING OR NOT NEEDING
HEALTH INSURANCE IN 2014 DOES NOT
PRECLUDE BALDWIN OR PACIFIC JUSTICE’S
CHALLENGE BECAUSE A REALISTIC DANGER
OF SUSTAINING A DIRECT INJURY HAS BEEN
SHOWN…………………………………………………….57
B. RIPENESS………………………………………………...……….59
III. THIS COURT SHOULD ENJOIN ENFORCEMENT OF
THE ENTIRE ACT BECAUSE THE ACT DOES NOT
INCLUDE A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE………………………..……….61
CONCLUSION…………………………..…………………………….…………63
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32(A)(7)(C) AND CIRCUIT RULE 32-1
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE FOR BRIEF IN PAPER FORMAT
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 5 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
vTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES:
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967) ………………………………...…………………31, 59
ACLU of Florida, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County School Bd.,
557 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2009) …………………………...……………….14
Alaska Airlines v. Brock,
480 U.S. 678 (1978)………………………………………………………..61
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union,
442 U.S. 289 (1979) , …………………………….……………………15, 58
Baldwin, et al. v. Sebelius, et al.,
562 U.S. ___ (2010) ………………………………………………………...9
Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corps.,
419 U.S. 102 (1974) ……………………………………….………15, 16, 59
Bland v. Fessler,
88 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 1996)………………………………..…...…..34, 35, 38
Carson Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson,
37 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1994)………………………………………...………25
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. State of West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553 (1923)……………………………………...………….…16, 57
Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius,
702 F.Supp.2d 598 (E.D.Va. 2010)………….….......9, 10, 11, 14, 54, 56, 60
Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch,
511 U.S. 767 (1994)………………………………………………………..46
Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., (1978)
438 U.S. 59 (1978)……………………..…………………..32, 33, 39, 59, 60
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 6 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—cont.
Page(s)
CASES:
Friends of Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,
528 U.S. 167(2000) ………………………………………………………..13
Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1 (2005)………………………………...……...….26, 27, 45-47, 50
Jones v. United States,
529 U.S. 848 (2000)…………………………….…………41, 43, 44, 49, 50
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992)………………………………………………..51, 53, 56
Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Federation,
497 U.S. 871(1990)……………………………..……………………….....53
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137(1803) …………………………………..................................3, 44
McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316 (1819)…………………………………………………………..3
Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for
Abatement of Aircraft Noises, Inc.,
501 U.S. 252 (1991) ……………………………………………………….34
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374 (1992)………………………………………………………..34
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation,
301 U.S. 1(1937)…………………………………………………………...43
Navegar, Inc. v. United States,
103 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1997)……..………………………………………34
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 7 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—cont.
Page(s)
CASES:
Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Commission,
461 U.S. 190 (1983)………………………………………………………..32
Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146 (1971)………………………………………………………..40
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
419 U.S. 102 (1942)………………………………..………………..…31, 32
Sammartano v. First Judicial District Court,
303 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2002)…………………………………………...…...24
State of Florida, et al. v. U.S. Dept. of HHS,
___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2010 WL 4010119 (N.D. Fla. 2010)….14-17, 56, 58, 60
Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452 (1974)………………………………………………………..34
Thomas More Law Center v. Obama,
___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2010 WL 3952805 (E.D. Mich. 2010)...12-14, 54-56, 60
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.,
473 U.S. 568 (1985)……………………..……………………………..31, 32
Turner v. United States,
396 U.S. 398 (1970) ……………………………………………………….46
United States v. Comstock,
560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010)…………………………….………..25
United States v. Holston,
343 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003)……………………………………………..…..49
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 8 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—cont.
Page(s)
CASES:
United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995)…………………………..………………..40-44, 48- 50
United States v. Maxwell,
446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006)……………………………………...……..49
United States v. McCoy,
323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.2003)…………………………………................49-51
United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000)……………………………...……………..41-44, 48-50
United States v. Patton,
451 F.3d 615 (10th Cir. 2006)………………………………..…………….49
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.,
315 U.S. 110 (1942)………………………………………………………..45
Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc.,
484 U.S. 383 (1988)………………………………………………………..34
Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977)……………………………………………………..…46
Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942)………………………..…….....….25, 27, 44, 45, 47, 50
Zielasko v. State of Ohio,
873 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1989)……………………………………………….34
STATUTES AND RULES:
CALIFORNIA MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAW
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §11362.5 ………………..…...……...45
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 9 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—cont.
Page(s)
STATUTES AND RULES:
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ACT,
84 Stat. 1242, 21 U.S.C. §801 et seq………………………………...…..…45
FED. R. APP. PRO. 4(a)(1)(A)………………………………..……..…………….....1
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 57…………………………………….………………….............1
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 65…………………...…………………………………………...1
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)…………..………………………………………….…49
28 USC § 1331…………………….……………………………………………….1
28 USC § 1343………….………………………………………………………….1
28 USC § 2201…………….……………………………………………………….1
28 USC § 2202………………….……………………………………………….…1
PUBLIC LAW 111-148 (“P.L. 111-148”),
124 STAT. 119 (Mar. 23, 2010)(the “Act”) …………………………passim
PUBLIC LAW 111-152 (“P.L. 111-152”),
124 STAT. 1029 (March 30, 2010) ……………………………………….1, 5
P.L. 111-148, Section 1311…..…………………………………………………..17
P.L. 111-148, Section 1501 (the “individual mandate”) ……...……………..passim
P.L. 111-148, Section 3012………………………………………………………20
P.L. 111-148, Section 3403…………………………………………………..18, 19
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 10 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
xTABLE OF AUTHORITIES—cont.
Page(s)
STATUTES AND RULES:
P.L. 111-148, Section 4001(d)(2)……………………..…………………………..21
P.L. 111-148, Section 4001(d)(7)………………..………………………………..21
P.L. 111-148, Section 4201……..………………….…………………………21, 22
P.L. 111-148, Section 4205………………………….………………………..22, 23
P.L. 111-148, Section 5103……………………….………………………………23
P.L. 111-148, Section 5204………………………….…………………………....23
P.L. 111-148, Section 5210…………………………….……………………..…..23
P.L. 111-148, Section 10106…………..…………….7, 8, 29, 31, 40, 42, 43, 48, 62
P.L. 111-148, Section 10320…………………………….………………………..18
CONSTITUTION:
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) …………………........47
U.S. CONST. PMBL ……………………………………….……………………...28
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Commerce Clause”) …………..……………..passim
U.S. CONST. art. III …………………………...…………………………..… passim
U.S. CONST. art. V …………………………..……………………………..……..44
SECONDARY MATERIALS:
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE WEBSITE, The Budgetary Treatment Of
An Individual Mandate To Buy Health Insurance 1 (1994),
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/doc38.pdf
(accessed: November 20, 2010)......................................................................2
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 11 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—cont.
Page(s)
SECONDARY MATERIALS:
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Requiring Individuals to
Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis 3 (2009),
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40725_20090724.pdf
(accessed: November 20, 2010)......................................................................3
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS, H.R. 3590,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@S
(accessed: September 11, 2010)……………………………………..……..4
Library of Congress, Government Printing Office, H.R. 3590,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_public_laws
&docid=f:publ148.pdf
(accessed: September 11, 2010)……………………………………………4
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, H.R. 4872,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ152.pdf
(accessed: September 11, 2010)…………………………………………….4
Council for National Policy Website
http://www.cfnp.org/Page.aspx?pid=180
(accessed: September 11, 2010)………………………………………..…...5
Will, George F., A few questions for nominee Elena Kagan, (June 28, 2010),
http://www.winonadailynews.com/news/opinion/article_edc351e2-82a7-11df-
8083-001cc4c002e0.html
(accessed: July 2, 2010) ...............................................................................28
HHS WEBSITE, Newsroom, Statement from HHS Secretary Kathleen
Sebelius on Expedited Efforts By HHS To Work With Insurers to
Voluntarily Provide Coverage for Graduating College Seniors and
Young Adults under Age Twenty-Six in Advance of September Start
Date in New Law, (April 19, 2010)
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/04/20100419a.html
(accessed: July 2, 2010)................................................................................36
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 12 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
xii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—cont.
Page(s)
SECONDARY MATERIALS:
HHS WEBSITE, Letter: Secretary Sebelius to Angela Braly, (April 22, 2010),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/04/wellpoint04222010.pdf
(accessed: July 2, 2010)................................................................................36
HHS WEBSITE, Newsroom, Sebelius Continues Work to Implement
Health Reform, Announces First Steps to Establish Temporary
High Risk Pool Program, (April 2, 2010)
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/04/20100402b.html
(accessed: July 2, 2010)................................................................................37
HHS website, Newsroom, Fact Sheet: The Affordable Care Act’s
New Patient’s Bill of Rights,
http://www.healthreform.gov/newsroom/new_patients_bill_of_rights.html
(accessed: July 2, 2010)................................................................................37
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 13 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
-1-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs-Appellants California Assemblyman Steve Baldwin (“Baldwin”)
and Pacific Justice Institute (“Pacific Justice”) appeal the August 27, 2010,
decision and judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of California denying their motion for preliminary injunction and granting
Defendants-Appellees’ motion to dismiss. (ER: 1-7.) 1 The district court had
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201, and 2202, and
Rules 57 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”).
On August 30, 2010, Baldwin and Pacific Justice timely filed their notice of
appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A). (ER: 65-85.)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the district court erred when it held that Appellants’ narrowly
tailored facial challenge to the individual mandate provision (Section 1501) of the
recently passed Health Care Legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, P.L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, P.L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010)(collectively the “Act”), is not justiciable under Article III because that
provision does not become effective until 2014.
1 “ER” refers to Appellants’ Excerpts of Record on Appeal, filed in support
of this brief.
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2. Whether the individual mandate provision in Section 1501 of the Act
exceeds Congress’ power under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution by
regulating and taxing a citizen’s decision not to participate in interstate commerce
(i.e., decision not to purchase health care insurance).
INTRODUCTION
The crux of this case was presciently stated in 1994 by the non-partisan
Congressional Budget Office (“Budget Office”) when it analyzed President
Clinton’s proposed health care legislation:
“A mandate requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance
would be an unprecedented form of federal action. The government
has never required people to buy any good or service as a condition of
lawful residence in the United States. An individual mandate would
have two features that, in combination, would make it unique. First, it
would impose a duty on individuals as members of society. Second, it
would require people to purchase a specific service that would be
heavily regulated by the federal government.” 2
More recently, in analyzing the individual mandate provision of the health
care legislation at issue in this case, the Congressional Research Service expressed
the same reservations as those in the 1994 Budget Office Report:
“Despite the breadth of powers that have been exercised under the
Commerce Clause, it is unclear whether the clause would provide a
2 See, Congressional Budget Office website, The Budgetary Treatment Of An
Individual Mandate To Buy Health Insurance 1 (1994),
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/doc38.pdf (accessed: November 20,
2010).
.
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solid constitutional foundation for legislation containing a
requirement to have health insurance. Whether such a requirement
would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause is perhaps the
most challenging question posed by such a proposal, as it is a novel
issue whether Congress may use this clause to require an individual to
purchase a good or a service.” 3
Furthermore, the Court should keep in mind that the overriding principle of
limited government is the cornerstone of the Constitution, which was articulated
early on by Chief Justice John Marshall in two landmark cases: “The powers of the
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or
forgotten, the constitution is written.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
176 (1803)(“Marbury”). Sixteen years later, Chief Justice Marshall further
clarified the principle announced in Marbury:
‘‘This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated
powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to
it, would seem too apparent, to have required to be enforced by all
those arguments, which its enlightened friends, while it was
depending before the people, found it necessary to urge; that principle
is now universally admitted.’’
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819)(“McCulloch”).
It is upon this stage that the constitutional drama over government imposed
health care will unfold.
3 See, Congressional Research Service, Requiring Individuals to Obtain
Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis 3 (2009),
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40725_20090724.pdf (accessed: November 20, 2010).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On Christmas Eve of 2009, the Senate passed its health care bill, which
originated under bill number H.R. 3590 and which the Senate titled: the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act. 4
On March 21, 2010, the House passed the Senate health care bill (H.R.
3590). 5
On March 23, 2010, the President signed the Senate health care bill (H.R.
3590) into law as P.L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119. Id.
On March 25, 2010, the House passed H.R. 4872, the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (“Reconciliation Bill”), which amended the
Senate Health Care Bill (P.L. 111-148). 6 The Reconciliation Bill (H.R. 4872) is
divided into two main parts, one addressing health care reform and the other
addressing student loan reform.
4 See, Library of Congress, Bills and Resolutions, H.R. 3590,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR03590:@@@S (accessed:
September 11, 2010).
5 See, Library of Congress, Government Printing Office, H.R. 3590,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ148.pdf (accessed:
September 11, 2010).
6 See, Library of Congress, Government Printing Office, H.R. 4872,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ152.pdf (accessed:
September 11, 2010).
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On March 30, 2010, the President signed the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (H.R. 4872) into law as P.L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
Id.
Petitioner Baldwin served in the California Assembly for the years 1994
through 2000. During his tenure in the California Legislature, he served as
Minority Whip and as Chairman of the Education Committee and served on the
Insurance Committee, the Health Committee, the Higher Education Committee, the
High Technology Committee, and the Revenue and Taxation Committee. (ER: 61,
¶2.)
After he completed his tenure in the California Legislature in 2000, Mr.
Baldwin took the position of Executive Director of the Council for National Policy
(“CNP”). CNP is a nonpartisan, educational foundation, whose members are
dedicated to the Founding Fathers’ belief in limited government. See, Council for
National Policy website, About Us, http://www.cfnp.org/Page.aspx?pid=180
(accessed: May 5, 2010). (ER: 61, ¶4.)
Mr. Baldwin does not wish to maintain health care insurance. Accordingly,
he does not consent and objects to being compelled by the Act to maintain health
care insurance. (ER: 62, ¶¶ 8 & 9.)
Petitioner Pacific Justice Institute is a public interest and an education and
legal defense organization. The areas in which Pacific Justice provides education
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and legal representation include but are not limited to: religious liberties; freedom
of speech, association, and assembly; protection and sanctity of human life;
parental rights; students’ rights in public schools and colleges; religious charities;
employees’ rights in the workplace; union members’ rights regarding contribution
to charities. (ER: 56, ¶2.)
Pacific Justice is an employer and provides health care insurance to its
employees and relies upon tax-deductible, charitable contributions for its operating
budget. As an employer, Pacific Justice does not consent and objects to being
compelled to comply with the Act because the Act imposes increased costs on it by
preventing it from denying health care insurance coverage to part-time employees.
(ER: 57, ¶7; 58, ¶13.)
Appellees are the United States Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) and Kathleen Sebelius as Secretary of the HHS, the Department of Labor
(“DOL”) and Hilda Solis as Secretary of the DOL, and the Department of the
Treasury (“DOT”) and Timothy Geithner as Secretary of the DOT (hereinafter
collectively referred to as “the government”). The government is charged with
enforcement of the Act. (ER: 2, ll. 3-6.)
By way of their complaint in the district court, Baldwin and Pacific Justice
sought, inter alia, declaratory and/or injunctive relief regarding the individual
mandate provision set forth in Section 1501 of the Act. (ER: 23-28.) Section
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1501(b) of the Act adds section 5000A(a) to the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26
U.S.C. (“IRC”), provides:
“Sec. 5000A(a) REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN
MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.—An applicable
individual shall for each month beginning after 2013
ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered
under minimum essential coverage for such month.”
Section 1501(b) of the Act mandates that individuals such as Baldwin must
maintain qualifying health care insurance coverage; otherwise, the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) will impose an ever increasing monetary penalty. See,
e.g., sections 1501(b) and 10106 of the Act. The Act refers to the monetary penalty
in two different ways, “SHARED RESPONSIBILITY PAYMENTS” and
“PENALTY”:
‘‘SEC. 5000A. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM
ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.
(b) SHARED RESPONSIBILITY PAYMENT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—If a taxpayer who is an applicable
individual, or an applicable individual for whom the taxpayer is liable under
paragraph (3), fails to meet the requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more
months, then, except as provided in subsection (e), there is hereby imposed
on the taxpayer a penalty with respect to such failures in the amount
determined under subsection (c)…
(3) PAYMENT OF PENALTY.—If an individual with
respect to whom a penalty is imposed by this section for any month…
(c) AMOUNT OF PENALTY.—
(1) IN GENERAL.— The amount of the penalty imposed
by this section on any taxpayer for any taxable year with respect to
failures described in subsection (b)(1) shall be equal to the lesser
of…”
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Section 1501(b) of the Act (as amended by section 10106(b)(1))(emphasis added). 7
Thus, the Act compels individuals to perform an affirmative act or incur a
penalty solely because they exist and reside in the United States. The Act reaches
inactivity (i.e., citizens who do not purchase health care insurance). Furthermore,
such inactivity by its very nature may not be deemed to be “in commerce” or to
have any “substantial effect on commerce,” whether interstate or otherwise, to
properly and constitutionally trigger Congress’ Commerce Power under Article I, §
8, cl. 3 of the Constitution. 8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 14, 2010, Baldwin and Pacific Justice filed their complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of the Act9; and
on May 19, 2010, filed their motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin
enforcement of the Act.
7 The specific calculations for each of the full amount of penalties imposed by
the Act are set forth in detail in Section 5000A(b) & (c).
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides: “The Congress shall have the power…3.
To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with
the Indian tribes.”
9 Although there were several different legal theories alleged, the only
challenge presented by way of this appeal is to the Individual Mandate provision of
the Act.
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On June 25, 2010, the government filed its motion to dismiss the complaint
under FRCP 12(b)(1)&(6) on the ground that Baldwin and Pacific Justice’s claims
were not justiciable under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Prior to decision by the district court below, on August 2, 2010, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the government’s
motion to dismiss for lack of justiciability under Article III, section 2, in a case that
also challenged the individual mandate (Section 1501) of the Act. Commonwealth
of Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F.Supp.2d 598 (E.D.Va. 2010)(“Virginia”). Baldwin
and Pacific Justice filed a supplemental brief in the district court below, along with
a copy of the district court’s opinion in Virginia.
On August 27, 2010, the district court denied Baldwin and Pacific Justice’s
motion for preliminary injunction and granted the government’s motion to dismiss.
(ER: 1-7.)
The notice of appeal was timely filed on August 30, 2010 (ER: 65-85), and
the case was docketed in this Court on September 1, 2010.
On September 15, 2010, Baldwin and Pacific Justice filed a petition for writ
of certiorari before judgment in the U.S. Supreme Court (“petition”).
On November 8, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Baldwin and Pacific
Justice’s petition. Baldwin, et al. v. Sebelius, et al., 562 U.S. ___ (2010).
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CASES IN OTHER CIRCUITS CHALLENGING THE ACT
Presently, there are three cases challenging the constitutionality of the Act
pending in district courts in the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits that are
relevant to this case. While these cases are not binding on this Court, they are
instructive and provide support for Baldwin and Pacific Justice’s position.
1. FOURTH CIRCUIT: THE VIRGINIA CASE
As mentioned above, on August 2, 2010, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia issued its memorandum opinion in Virginia. As in
the case at Bar, at issue in Virginia is the constitutionality of the individual
mandate set forth in Section 1501(b) of the Act (hereinafter “individual mandate”),
including Baldwin and Pacific Justice’s arguments that Congress exceeded its
authority under the Commerce Clause and the government’s argument that the case
is not ripe for review under Article III. Virginia, supra, 702 F.Supp.2d at 601.
In denying the government’s motion to dismiss in Virginia, the Honorable
Henry E. Hudson dispatched the government’s argument that the case was not
justiciable under Article III because the individual mandate provision did not go
into effect until 2014:
“The issues presented are purely legal and further development of the
factual record would not clarify the issues for judicial
resolution...Neither the White House nor Congress has given any
indication that the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision [i.e., the
individual mandate] at issue will not be enforced, and the Court sees
no reason to assume otherwise. The issues in this case are fully
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framed, the underlying facts are well settled, and the case is
accordingly ripe for review. The Commonwealth has therefore
satisfied all requirements of Article III standing”
Id. at 608.
Consistent with Baldwin and Pacific Justice’s position throughout the
proceedings, Judge Hudson articulated that Congress has sailed into new
constitutional waters regarding the individual mandate: “The congressional
enactment under review—the [individual mandate] Provision—literally forges new
ground and extends Commerce Clause powers beyond its current high watermark.
Id. at 609. Judge Hudson continued: “No specifically articulated constitutional
authority exists to mandate the purchase of health insurance or the assessment of a
penalty for failing to do so.” Id. at 612. Moreover, during oral argument in
Virginia, Secretary Sebelius admitted as much and more:
“The Secretary appeared to concede during oral argument, however,
that if the ability to require the Minimum Essential Coverage
Provision is not within the letter and spirit of the Constitution, [then]
the penalty necessarily fails...”
Id. at 614. As admitted by the Assistant U.S. Attorney General during oral
argument, “if it [i.e., the individual mandate] is unconstitutional, then the penalty
would fail as well.” Id.
Finally, in Virginia (as in the case at Bar), the government made the
argument that the case is not justiciable under Article III because the individual
mandate provision does not become effective until 2014. However, Judge Hudson
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dispatched this argument, driving home the principle that Congress cannot insulate
its enactments by merely postponing the starting date, while spending the next four
years revving up the engine:
“While the mandatory compliance provisions of the [individual
mandate] Provision do not go into effect until 2014, that does not
mean that its effects will not be felt by the Commonwealth in the near
future. This provision will compel scores of people who are not
currently enrolled to evaluate and contract for insurance coverage.
Individuals currently insured will be required to be sure that their
present plans comply with this regulatory regimen. Insurance carriers
will have to take steps in the near future to accommodate the influx of
new enrollees to public and private insurance plans. Employers will
need to determine if their current insurance satisfies the statutory
requirements.”
Id. at 608.
2. SIXTH CIRCUIT: THE MICHIGAN CASE
On October 7, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan issued its decision in Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, ___
F.Supp.2d ___, 2010 WL 3952805 (E.D. Mich. 2010)(“Thomas More”). Contrary
to the district court’s decision in the case at Bar, in Thomas More the district court
held that plaintiffs’ challenge to the individual mandate was justiciable under
Article III. Id. at *2-5.
In Thomas More, as in the case at Bar, the plaintiffs’ alleged basis for
standing was that they “object to being compelled by the federal government to
purchase health care coverage.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added). In support of its
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finding of standing and ripeness under Article III, the district court in Thomas
More reasoned:
“[T]he government is requiring plaintiffs to undertake an expenditure,
for which the government must anticipate that significant financial
planning will be required. That financial planning must take place
well in advance of the actual purchase of insurance in 2014.
Plaintiffs’ decisions to forego certain spending today, so they will
have the funds to pay for health insurance when the Individual
Mandate takes effect in 2014, are injuries fairly traceable to the Act
for the purposes of conferring standing. There is nothing improbable
about the contention that the Individual Mandate is causing plaintiffs
to feel economic pressure today. See Friends of Earth [v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000)].”
Id. at *4.
In addressing the issue of ripeness, the district court in Thomas More
identified the need for expediency in deciding the constitutionality of the
individual mandate provision, which is an interest that is held not only by the
plaintiffs in Thomas More but the government as well:
“It certainly appears that the government has an interest in knowing
sooner, rather than later, whether an essential part of its program
regulating the national health care market is constitutional, although in
this case it is not the government asking for the review.”
Id. at *5.
In Thomas More, the district court recognized that there is no need for any
further development of a factual record before the judiciary can review the
constitutionality of the individual mandate provision:
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“This case presents a purely legal issue which ‘would not be clarified
by further factual development.’ Therefore, this case is ripe for
consideration by the court.”
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Finally, the district court in Thomas More went on to uphold the individual
mandate provision under Article I, section 8, clause 3, the Interstate Commerce
Clause. Id. at *6-10.
3. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: THE FLORIDA CASE
On October 14, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Florida issued its decision in State of Florida, et al. v. U.S. Dept. of HHS, ___
F.Supp.2d ___, 2010 WL 4010119 (N.D. Fla.)(“Florida”). Contrary to the district
court’s decision in the case at Bar but consistent with Virginia and Thomas More,
in Florida the district court held that plaintiffs’ challenge to the individual mandate
provision was justiciable under Article III. Id. at *17-23.
In finding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the individual mandate
provision even though it is not effective until 2014, the district court in Florida
concluded:
“[T]he injury alleged in this case will not occur at ‘some indefinite
future time.’ Instead, the date is definitively fixed in the Act and
will occur in 2014, when the individual mandate goes into effect
and the individual plaintiffs are forced to buy insurance or pay
the penalty. See ACLU of Florida, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County School
Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1194 (11th Cir. 2009) (standing shown in pre-
enforcement challenge where the claimed injury was ‘pegged to a
sufficiently fixed period of time’). Because time is the primary factor
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here, this case presents a durational issue, and not a contingency issue.
‘A plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic
danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s
operation or enforcement. But, one does not have to await the
consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If
the injury is certainly impending, that is enough.’ Babbitt v. United
Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 60 L.
Ed. 2d 895 (1979) (citations and brackets omitted).”
Id. at *18 (emphasis added).
In Florida, the government raised a temporal argument that, since 2014 was
forty months away, it is so far off in time that plaintiffs do not have standing. The
district court rejected this argument:
“The defendants concede that an injury does not have to occur
immediately to qualify as an injury-in-fact, but they argue that forty
months ‘is far longer than typically allowed.’ Def. Mem. at 27. It is
true that forty months is longer than the time period at issue in the
particular cases the defendants cite… But, the fact that the harm was
closer in those cases does not necessarily mean that forty months is
ipso facto ‘too far off.’… Imposition of the individual mandate and
penalty, like the fee in Village of Bensenville, is definitively fixed in
time and impending. And absent action by this court, starting in
2014, the federal government will begin enforcing it.”
Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added).
As to the issue of ripeness, in Florida the government argued that since the
individual mandate does not become effective until 2014, there can be no injury
until that time. In rejecting this argument, the district court cited the Supreme
Court’s decision in Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 143
(1974)(“Blanchette”):
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“However, ‘[w]here the inevitability of the operation of a statute
against [plaintiffs] is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a
justiciable controversy that there will be a time delay before the
disputed provisions come into effect.’ [Blanchette]. ‘The Supreme
Court has long...held that where the enforcement of a statute is
certain, a preenforcement challenge will not be rejected on
ripeness grounds.’ (citing Blanchette, supra, 419 U.S. at 143).”
Florida, supra, at 22 (internal citation omitted)(emphasis added).
As to the issue of ripeness, the district court in Florida further concluded
that the individual mandate provision is the cornerstone of the Act and will be
enforced, and, therefore, is ripe to be challenged before its effective date:
“The complained of injury in this case is ‘certainly impending’ as
there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that the federal government
will enforce the individual mandate and employer mandate against the
plaintiffs. Indeed, with respect to the individual mandate in particular,
the defendants concede that it is absolutely necessary for the Act’s
insurance market reforms to work as intended. In fact, they refer to it
as an ‘essential’ part of the Act at least fourteen times in their motion
to dismiss. It will clearly have to be enforced. See Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. State of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592-93, 262
U.S. 553, 43 S. Ct. 658 (1923) (suit filed shortly after the challenged
statute passed into law and before it was enforced was not premature
where the statute ‘certainly would operate as the complainant states
apprehended it would’).”
Florida, supra, at 22.
/////
/////
/////
/////
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Finally, the district court in Florida went on to find that the individual
mandate provision may be unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’ power
under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 33-35.10
SUMMARY OF HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION
The following is an abridged summary of the 2,559 pages of the Act in order
to provide the Court with a fuller view of the scope of the federal take-over of
health care at the national, state, and local levels.
1. CONGRESS MANDATES STATES TO CREATE HEALTH EXCHANGES
Under section 1311(b) of the Act, Congress mandates that every state shall
create an American Health Benefit Exchange (“Exchange”). The purpose of an
Exchange is defined as follows: “An Exchange shall make available qualified
health plans to qualified individuals and qualified employers.” See, section
1311(d). Essentially, the federal government is entering the health care and health
insurance businesses, as well as commanding the states to do the same.
/////
/////
/////
/////
10 However, the district court was not required to decide the question at this point
because it denied the government’s FRCP Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because
“plaintiffs have at least stated a plausible claim” that the individual mandate
transgresses the Commerce Clause. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
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2. THE “INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD”11
Congress vests this Board with broad and unfettered powers to carry out cost
reductions to meet the per capita growth requirements under Medicare, which
would necessarily include, but are not limited to: (a) denial of claims or services;
(b) reduction of benefits; (c) increase of deductibles; and (d) rationing of health
care. See, section 3403 (adds 42 U.S.C. § 1899A(b)) and section 10320(a)(5). The
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints 15 members to the
Board for terms of six years. See, section 3403 (adds 42 U.S.C. § 1899A(g)).
The Board’s proposals are carried into effect by the Secretary of HHS.
However, the Secretary’s implementation is not reviewable:
‘‘(5) LIMITATION ON REVIEW.—There shall be no administrative
or judicial review under section 1869, section 1878, or otherwise of
the implementation by the Secretary under this subsection of the
recommendations contained in a proposal.”
See, section 3403 (adds 42 U.S.C. § 1899A(e); emphasis added).
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Board is Congress’ self-limiting
jurisdiction over the Board’s actions. For example, section 3403 adds 42 U.S.C. §
1899A(d)(3)(B), wherein Congress has divested itself of jurisdiction to change any
11 The original name of this Board in Title III of the Act, section 3403(a), was
“Independent Medicare Advisory Board” but after press reports began to refer to
this Board as “Death Panels,” Congress amended the Act in Title X to rename the
Board to “Independent Payment Advisory Board.” See, section 10320(b).
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of the Board’s decisions or recommendations by making it procedurally out of
order in the House and Senate to alter the Board’s decision:
“It shall not be in order in the Senate or the House of Representatives
to consider any bill, resolution, amendment, or conference report that
would repeal or otherwise change this subsection.”
See, section 3403 (adds 42 U.S.C. § 1899A(d)(3)(C)). If this were not enough,
Congress then made it virtually impossible to dissolve the Board. Specifically, if
any action is taken by Congress to dissolve the Board, a three-fifths super-majority
vote is required in both houses:
“(f) JOINT RESOLUTION REQUIRED TO DISCONTINUE THE
BOARD.—(1)(F) MAJORITY REQUIRED FOR ADOPTION.—A
joint resolution shall require an affirmative vote of three-fifths of the
Members, duly chosen and sworn, for adoption.”
See, section 3403 (adds 42 U.S.C. § 1899A(f); emphasis added). Essentially,
Congress has created a Health Care Oligarchy.
3. THE WORKING GROUP ON HEALTH CARE QUALITY
This Working Group is comprised of virtually all of the departments and
agencies within the federal government, including the Department of Defense,
Coast Guard, and Federal Bureau of Prisons.12
12 Included within the Working Group are: the Department of Health and
Human Services; the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; the National
Institutes of Health; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; the Food and
Drug Administration; the Health Resources and Services Administration; the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; the Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technology; the Substance Abuse and Mental
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 32 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
-20-
The Working Group’s responsibilities include, for example, collaboration,
cooperation, and consultation between departments regarding developing and
disseminating strategies, goals, models, and timetables that are consistent with the
national health care priorities. See, section 3012(b)(1)-(3). As individuals within
and between departments or agencies have conflicts with regard to jurisdiction,
strategies, methods, etc., one can only imagine the chaos that will be caused by a
group with this many independent departments and agencies.
4. THE NATIONAL PREVENTION, HEALTH PROMOTION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH
COUNCIL
The over-all objective of this Council is the “prevention of chronic disease
and improving public health.” While it sounds like a noble charge, it begs the
question: how did America’s health care become the envy of the world without the
help of this Council? Much like the Working Group discussed in the preceding
subsection, this Council is comprised of the secretaries of the federal government’s
departments and directors of agencies, including, for example, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, and the Secretary of
Health Services Administration; the Administration for Children and Families; the
Department of Commerce; the Office of Management and Budget; the United
States Coast Guard; the Federal Bureau of Prisons; the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration; the Federal Trade Commission; the Social Security
Administration; the Department of Labor; the United States Office of Personnel
Management; the Department of Defense; the Department of Education; the
Department of Veterans Affairs; the Veterans Health Administration. See, section
3012(c)(1).
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 33 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
-21-
Transportation. See, section 4001(c)(1)-(13). As to powers of the Council, it is
charged with the responsibility to:
“[D]evelop a national prevention, health promotion, public health, and
integrative health care strategy that incorporates the most effective
and achievable means of improving the health status of Americans
and reducing the incidence of preventable illness and disability in the
United States.”
See, section 4001(d)(2). This section goes on to create unlimited and undefined
power in the Council to “carry out other activities determined appropriate by the
President.” See, section 4001(d)(7). It is easy to imagine the mischief that could be
accomplished with such an open-ended grant of power to the Executive Branch.
5. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INSERTS ITSELF INTO LOCAL
COMMUNITIES—“CREATING HEALTHIER COMMUNITIES”
From afar, Congress inserts itself into the affairs of local communities for
the ostensible goal of “creating healthier communities.” Some of the specific areas
that will be within federal control include, for example: (a) control in school
environments—food options, physical activities, lifestyles, emotional wellness,
curricula, and other activities; (b) creation of infrastructure to support “active
living” and access to “nutritious food in a safe environment;” (c) implementation
of worksite “wellness” programs; and (d) “highlighting” healthy options at
restaurants. See, section 4201(a)-(c)(2).
Perhaps the more intrusive aspect of this area of the Act is the monitoring of
citizens’ behavior as to: changes in weight; changes in proper nutrition; changes in
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physical activity; changes in tobacco use prevalence; and changes in emotional
well-being and overall mental health. See, section 4201(c)(3).
6. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S CONTROL OVER RESTAURANTS, RETAIL
FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS, AND VENDING MACHINES
The federal government will now dictate how restaurants and retail food
establishments print their menus and menu boards. Specifically, the Act has very
detailed specifications on what nutrition information must appear on menus, menu
boards, and drive-through window ordering displays. In addition, each restaurant
and retail food establishment must have printed versions of their menus, menu
boards, and drive-through window displays to provide to consumers upon request.
In the case of food bars, salad bars, and other self-service food establishments,
nutritional labeling must be in close proximity to the food item in the bar. See,
section 4205 (adds 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H)(i)-(iii)). Finally, the nutritional
information required on menus, etc., must be based upon a “reasonable basis,”
which the Act defines as “including nutrient databases, cookbooks, laboratory
analyses, and other ‘reasonable means.’” See, section 4205 (adds 21 U.S.C. §
343(q)(5)(H)(iv)).
The federal government also regulates vending machines in the same
manner, requiring nutritional labeling “in close proximity to each article of food or
the selection button that includes a clear and conspicuous statement disclosing the
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number of calories contained in the article.” See, section 4205 (adds 21 U.S.C. §
343(q)(5)(H)(viii)).
7. GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE
This portion of the Act has an entire title dedicated to its establishment, Title
V, and would take an entire legal memorandum to provide a comprehensive
summary. However, some of the more salient sections include, for example: (a)
section 1501 creates a fifteen member Health Care Workforce Commission
(empowered to: gather and disseminate information relating to retention of health
care professionals; communicate important policies and practices regarding health
care workforce; review health care professionals training and education programs);
(b) section 5103 creates the National Center For Health Care Workforce Analysis
(coordinates with the National Health Care Workforce Commission, and relevant
regional and State centers and agencies, regarding analysis of the health care
workforce and workforce related issues); (c) section 5204 creates the Public Health
Workforce Loan Repayment Program (in exchange for students’ agreement to
work in a government health agency for three years or longer, the federal
government will repay student loans up to $35,000 per year).
However, the aspect most troubling to liberty is section 5210, which creates
the Commissioned Corps and Ready Reserve Corps. The Ready Reserve Corps are
appointed by the President; whereas, the Commissioned Corps are appointed by
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the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Both Corps will be under
the direct command of the Surgeon General, who has the power to call them to
active duty at any time. The Corps can be used in public health situations, as well
as to engage in “emergency response missions.” In these and other “situations,” it
is an open question as to whether the members of the Corps will be armed and
deployed as military soldiers. Finally, at the command of the Surgeon General,
deployments include both domestic and foreign.
8. CONCLUSION
The foregoing summary includes only a fraction of the Act’s provisions in
highlighted form. However, it should be abundantly clear from the foregoing that
Congress has inserted itself into a portion of American society that is more
appropriately left to the private sector and the universities rather than in distant
government departments, agencies, and bureaucracies.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion for preliminary
injunction, this Court should apply the de novo standard of review: “[where] the
district court's ruling rests solely on a premise of law and the facts are either
established or undisputed, our review is de novo.” Sammartano v. First Judicial
District Court, 303 F.3d 959, 964-65 (9th Cir.2002). Similarly, the issue of whether
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a case is justiciable is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. Carson
Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson, 37 F.3d 468, 474 (9th Cir.1994).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Roscoe Filburn could not have imagined that when he decided to plant a
little extra wheat on his small farm to feed his livestock and for his family’s
personal consumption that an ever increasing expansion of federal power would be
initiated. See, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)(“Wickard”). Since the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wickard, Congress has slowly but inevitably
encroached upon every aspect of life in America, culminating in the 2,559 page
piece of legislation in this case that constitutes a federal takeover of the health care
and health insurance industries.
Furthermore, the individual mandate provision in Section 1501 of the Act
exceeds Congress’ power under Article I, § 8, cl. 3 (the “Commerce Clause”) as it
is an express exercise of a general police power. As recently as last term, the
Supreme Court confirmed that Congress is not vested with general police powers:
“Nor need we fear that our holding today confers on Congress a general ‘police
power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the
States.’" United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1964 (2010)
(“Comstock”).
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It is axiomatic that quantity is often not a measure of quality, but in the
district court the government devoted a significant amount of argument to support
that the individual mandate is a proper exercise of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. However, the government’s reasoning under Article I ignores
Baldwin and Pacific Justice’s central position, to wit: the “aggregate” of inactivity,
is still inactivity, which does not trigger a constitutional exercise of congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause.
Regardless of how large the health care and health insurance industries are,
how susceptible to government regulation these industries might be, how
expansive the authority to regulate it may be, or how much overhaul may be
needed, Congress may only operate within the confines of its enumerated powers
set forth in the Constitution; and the government’s arguments to the contrary
notwithstanding, the Constitution does not give Congress the authority to create an
activity where one does not exist for the sole purpose of regulating it.
Even if the de minimis nature of an activity was rationally related to
Congress’ conclusions in regulating the aggregate of the activity, the size or extent
of an existing commercial activity on the one hand, and creating commercial
activity for the purpose of regulating it, on the other hand, are two completely
different things. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (“Raich”). In its
arguments, the government uses circular reasoning by relying on its own self-
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created premise: that Congress has unlimited authority to regulate this type of
commerce (i.e., health care and health care insurance), in order to conclude their
central premise, that Congress is empowered to impose the individual mandate on
all Americans.
The government’s reasoning for Commerce Clause justification stands (and
falls) entirely on its argument that the aggregate repercussions of an inactivity (i.e.,
such as Baldwin not maintaining health insurance) substantially affects interstate
commerce, which justifies creating commerce where none exists. However,
Baldwin and Pacific Justice are unaware of any Supreme Court or circuit court
decision that has held that Congress is empowered by Article I to compel citizens
to purchase goods or services because the aggregate impact of their choice not to
purchase a good or service had a substantial affect on interstate commerce.
Furthermore, the government’s arguments misinterpret and misapply Wickard and
Raich for the self-serving purpose of claiming that “Congress may employ its
Commerce Clause authority to address these substantial, aggregate effects.” In
both of those cases there was an existing activity to begin with, and, therefore,
those cases are clearly distinguishable from the case at Bar: in Raich, marijuana
was already being grown, and in Wickard, wheat was being grown, in both cases
prior to government intervention. See, Raich and Wickard, supra.
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Applying the government’s logic, the aggregate impact of millions of
Americans choosing not to purchase a car would have a substantial affect on the
interstate automobile industry. If, hypothetically, and antithetically to reality, the
cost of automobiles went up as demand went down, the Commerce Clause does not
vest Congress with the power to command all Americans to then purchase a
vehicle in order to keep costs down for the remnant.
Similarly, if Congress found that the aggregate cost of obesity had a
substantial affect on interstate commerce and drove costs up for everyone else,
could, under the government’s logic, Congress constitutionally command obese
persons to pay money to attend weight control programs like Weight Watchers? If
Congress found that ignorance substantially affects interstate commerce could it
require students to perform three hours of homework each night? 13 Of course not,
because Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause, or any part of the
Constitution, to command Americans to engage in such activity. Our system of
limited government is specifically built to “secure the blessings of liberty,” and
prevent such government intrusion. U.S. CONST. PMBL. Consequently, there is no
difference between the inactivity of not purchasing an automobile, not attending
13 The obesity and homework hypotheticals are borrowed from an article
written by Nationally Syndicated Columnist, George F. Will. See, Will, George F.,
A few questions for nominee Elena Kagan, (June 28, 2010),
http://www.winonadailynews.com/news/opinion/article_edc351e2-82a7-11df-
8083-001cc4c002e0.html (accessed: July 2, 2010).
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weight control programs, and not doing one’s homework, and the inactivity of not
maintaining health care insurance, regardless of the aggregate effects of each.
Accordingly, the government’s circular reasoning as to why inactivity constitutes
activity, which can be regulated by Congress, should be rejected by this Court.
As to the issue of whether Baldwin and Pacific Justice’s constitutional claim
regarding the individual mandate is justiciable at this time, the government has not
answered the compelling question regarding section 1501(b) of the Act’s
requirement for individuals to maintain minimum health insurance coverage: Why,
if it was so important, if the Nation was so desperate for nationalization of the
health care and health insurance industries, was the individual mandate delayed
until 2014? Especially in light of Congressional findings that those who choose not
to maintain health insurance coverage would frustrate the very purpose of the Act
because they would shift the cost to other Americans and health care providers:
“In the absence of the [individual mandate] requirement, some
individuals would make an economic and financial decision to forego
health insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure, which increases
financial risks to households and medical providers.”
Section 10106(a)(emphasis added). Furthermore, delaying the individual mandate
for four years makes absolutely no sense in the face of the ostensible justification
that proponents have been professing for the last decade, to wit: that “tens of
millions of Americans are without health care coverage!”
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Again, why the delay until 2014 before the individual mandate becomes
effective? It is Baldwin and Pacific Justice’s position that the delay of the
individual mandate was an intentional attempt to divest individual Americans and
organizations of Article III standing. This is because when one considers the
obvious constitutional violation—that Congress has exceeded its authority under
the Commerce Clause—it makes sense to divest individual Americans of Article
III standing by delaying the effectiveness of the individual mandate until 2014.
Meanwhile, all the other provisions of the Act commence, infrastructure is put in
place, health care providers and insurance companies change their delivery
systems, an enormous federal bureaucracy is created, a multitude of federal
regulations are written and enforced, and, inter alia, trillions of dollars are
expended. Congress knew that if the Act could move forward uncontested for
enough time, federal judges would be much more hesitant to reverse the legislation
after trillions of dollars had been invested between 2010 and 2014.
For example, in some federal court in the year 2014 the government will no
doubt argue that:
“Your Honor, truly, I understand that the individual mandate is
constitutionally suspect; however, the people have spent trillions of
dollars to build the infrastructure for health care and health insurance
delivery systems; health care providers and health insurance carriers
have relied on changes made and regulations implemented over the
past four years. We have just gone too far down this road to turn
back now because of some anachronistic constitutional nuance.”
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Moreover, the event that Baldwin and Pacific Justice contend is inevitable is
the enforcement of the individual mandate, which is not only required by section
1501(b) of the Act but also self-executing. There is nothing abstract about this
section of the Act; nor will this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction violate the principle
underlying the Ripeness Doctrine, which is designed:
“…to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements...”
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)(“Abbott”).
Consistent with the principles announced in Abbott, the individual mandate
is neither an abstraction nor a disagreement, but rather is an actual and clear
inevitability. Further, this case is not a situation where Baldwin and Pacific
Justice’s claims are vague and “contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985)(“Union Carbide”). It is disingenuous
for the government to argue that section 1501(b) is beyond challenge until 2014.
This is because the individual mandate is the cornerstone of the Act and the
congressional justification for invoking the Commerce Clause to pass the Act (see,
section 10106(a)).
In Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1942), the
Supreme Court held that:
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“Where the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain
individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable
controversy that there will be a time delay before the disputed
provision will come into effect.”
Id. at 143. There is no question that the individual mandate requirement of the Act
applies to Baldwin as it does to all Americans, and is inevitable and self-executing.
Furthermore, delayed judicial review of the Act would also “impose a palpable and
considerable hardship” on Baldwin, as well as all Americans, by permitting the Act
to be implemented “without knowing whether [the individual mandate] is valid.”
Union Carbide, supra, 473 U.S. at 581 (citing Pacific Gas & Electric Company v.
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, 461 U.S.
190, 201 (1983)).
Since there are no factual disputes and the issues raised in this case are
purely legal, there is no further factual development required in order for this Court
to make a determination on the constitutionality of the individual mandate. Stated
another way, the dictates of the individual mandate are clearly set forth in section
1501(b) and are self-executing, to wit: individuals must maintain a congressionally
mandated amount of health care insurance. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
developed a prudential component of the Ripeness Doctrine, which supports that a
pre-enforcement determination of the individual mandate may be made by this
Court at this time. See, e.g., Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978)(“Duke Power”). In Duke Power, the
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Supreme Court found the Ripeness Doctrine was not a bar to a pre-enforcement
challenge, even where no nuclear accident had yet occurred (i.e., it was an
uncertain, future event—the same argument rejected in Duke Power is now being
made by the government in the case at Bar):
“The prudential considerations embodied in the ripeness doctrine also
argue strongly in favor for a prompt resolution of the claims
presented. Although it is true that no nuclear accident has yet occurred
and that such an occurrence would eliminate much of the existing
scientific uncertainty surrounding this subject, it would not, in our
view, significantly advance our ability to deal with the legal issues
presented nor aid us in their resolution…Since we are persuaded
that ‘we will be in no better a position later than we are now’ to
decide [the constitutional] question, we hold that it is presently
ripe for adjudication.”
Id. at 81-82 (emphasis added).
The government has presented no explanation as to how any district or
circuit court would be in any better a position in 2014 than it is presently to decide
the serious and substantial constitutional question relating to the individual
mandate. Moreover, here, as in Duke Power, prudence dictates that before the
health care and health insurance industries are transformed from private entities to
agents of the federal government and trillions of dollars are spent, the
constitutionality of the Act’s cornerstone, the individual mandate, should be
decided now rather than in four years. Id.
A finding by this Court that this case is justiciable under Article III is
supported not only by the foregoing and below cited authorities but also the
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following examples: Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for
Abatement of Aircraft Noises, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 265 n.13 (1991) (stating that the
claim was ripe where the challenged veto power “hangs . . . like the sword over
Damocles, creating a ‘here-and-now subservience’”); Virginia v. American
Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988) (holding that the plaintiff had
standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to a regulation of booksellers and
that the claim was ripe given that the statute created a pull towards self-
censorship); Zielasko v. State of Ohio, 873 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1989)(emphasizing
that the fear of a legal penalty can constitute an actual harm or injury sufficient to
present a ripe claim); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (holding
challenge ripe given that a contrary finding “may place the hapless plaintiff
between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of
forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity”); Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992) (holding challenge ripe,
where respondents were “faced with a Hobson’s choice” of compliance with the
law or penalty); Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 998-99 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (holding challenge ripe because a threat of prosecution can put the
threatened party “between a rock and a hard place”).
This Court has also recognized that allowing such pre-enforcement
challenges promotes the rule of law. See, e.g., Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729 (9th
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Cir. 1996) (“Bland”). In Bland, this Court stated that the pre-enforcement
constitutional challenge to California’s prohibition from using automatic dialing
and announcement devices “was altogether reasonable and demonstrates a
commendable respect for the rule of law.” Id. at 737. Bland is worth noting
because it concerned statutes that the California Attorney General had never
enforced, nor did the state provide any indication whether the statutes would ever
be enforced. In spite of this, this Court held the case to be justiciable under Article
III:
“While the Attorney General has never enforced the civil statute
against anyone, we are not troubled by the pre-enforcement nature of
this suit. The State has not suggested that the newly enacted law will
not be enforced, and we see no reason to assume otherwise. We
conclude that plaintiffs have alleged an actual and well founded fear
that the law will be enforced against them.”
Id.
In the case at Bar, there is more than enough evidence demonstrating that
the government will be enforcing the individual mandate, along with all the other
provisions of the Act, and, therefore, as in Bland, the fear is “actual and well
founded.” Id. For example, even before a certain provision of the Act went into
effect, HHS Secretary Sebelius had contacted insurance companies in an attempt to
persuade them into early compliance with the Act:
“Following our initial conversations and outreach to insurers, we are
encouraged by the actions of WellPoint, United Healthcare, and other
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companies to bridge the gap between now and the fall when the
law becomes effective.” 14
Furthermore, On April 22, 2010, Secretary Sebelius sent a letter to the CEO
of WellPoint, Inc., Angela Braly, publicly chastising her regarding company
practices that Secretary Sebelius admitted were legal. Besides the hostile tenor of
the letter written by a government official to a well respected leader of a private
corporation listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the fact that Secretary
Sebelius relied exclusively on a press report is disturbing. Clearly, Secretary
Sebelius’ letter was a shot over the bow, so to speak, regarding how she intended
to enforce the Act (no doubt a “Warning to all”):
“I was surprised and disappointed to read media accounts indicating
that WellPoint routinely rescinds health insurance coverage from
women recently diagnosed with breast cancer. Today’s reports from
Reuters indicating that your company ‘has specifically targeted
women with breast cancer for aggressive investigation with the intent
to cancel their policies’ is disturbing and this practice deplorable. As
you know, the practice described in this article will soon be illegal.
WellPoint should not wait to end the unconscionable practice…I
urge you to immediately cease these practices and abandon your
efforts to rescind health insurance coverage…”15
14 See, HHS website, Newsroom, Statement from HHS Secretary Kathleen
Sebelius on Expedited Efforts By HHS To Work With Insurers to Voluntarily
Provide Coverage for Graduating College Seniors and Young Adults under Age
Twenty-Six in Advance of September Start Date in New Law, (April 19, 2010),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/04/20100419a.html (accessed: July 2,
2010) (emphasis added).
15 See, HHS website, Letter: Secretary Sebelius to Angela Braly, (April 22,
2010), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/04/wellpoint04222010.pdf
(accessed: July 2, 2010) (emphasis added).
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On April 2, 2010, Secretary Sebelius sent letters to state governors and
insurance commissioners trying to enlist them in the establishment of a temporary
high-risk pool under the Act:
“We are interested in building upon existing state programs in this
important initiative to provide expanded access to health coverage for
individuals who cannot otherwise obtain health insurance. To that
end, I am writing you today to request an expression of your
state’s interest in participating in this temporary high risk pool
program, consistent with one of the implementation options
described below.” 16
In addition, and what strikes fear in the minds of Baldwin, Pacific Justice,
and countless other Americans, is that Secretary Sebelius continues to demonize
the health insurance industry:
“Too often, insurance companies put insurance company bureaucrats
between you and your doctor. The Affordable Care Act cracks down
on the some of the most egregious practices of the insurance
industry…”17
Unfortunately, Secretary Sebelius’ use of a term such as “crack down”
conjures up images of Elliot Ness’ “cracking down” on Al Capone’s reign of terror
in Chicago. Furthermore, perhaps the irony was lost upon Secretary Sebelius when
16 See, HHS website, Newsroom, Sebelius Continues Work to Implement
Health Reform, Announces First Steps to Establish Temporary High Risk Pool
Program, (April 2, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/04/20100402b.html
(accessed: July 2, 2010) (emphasis in original).
17 See, HHS website, Newsroom, Fact Sheet: The Affordable Care Act’s New
Patient’s Bill of Rights, (June 22, 2010),
http://www.healthreform.gov/newsroom/new_patients_bill_of_rights.html
(accessed: July 2, 2010) (emphasis added).
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she opined about “insurance company bureaucrats” due to the fact that she leads
the largest government bureaucracy in history. In any event, after considering the
Act and Secretary Sebelius’ actions as outlined above, this Court in Bland would
not be “troubled by the pre-enforcement nature of” Baldwin and Pacific Justice’s
claims in the case at Bar—there can be no doubt that the government intends to
and presently is enforcing provisions of the Act, including ones that become
effective at future dates. Bland, supra, at 737.
Another lesson learned from Bland provides guidance regarding the Article I
and III issues raised in this case. Specifically, in Bland, the California statutes at
issue prohibited and regulated activity occurring in interstate commerce—use of
telephone lines in the prohibited manner. Contrariwise, in the case at Bar, the
individual mandate provision of the Act attempts to regulate inactivity.
Finally, and as will be further expounded upon below, Baldwin and Pacific
Justice believe a fair and constitutional application of the foregoing and below
cited cases under Article III would support this Court’s finding of justiciability in
this case because:
1. Baldwin and Pacific Justice’s constitutional claims are purely legal
(here, a narrowly tailored, pre-enforcement facial challenge to the Act);
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2. An act of Congress presents a clear constitutional violation (here the
individual mandate exceeds Congress’ power under Article I, sec. 8 (i.e.,
Commerce Clause);
3. Enforcement of an indispensable section of the challenged act of
Congress is not only inevitable, but, as the government maintains, is necessary to
implement the purpose of the legislation (here the individual mandate is the
cornerstone upon which the Act depends);
4. Delay in resolving the constitutional questions does not place a district
or circuit court in a better position than if they were immediately addressed (here,
as in Duke Power, delaying review of the constitutionality of the individual
mandate serves no prudential consideration under the Ripeness Doctrine); and
5. An issue of significant public importance is at stake and that prompt
resolution of the constitutionality of the challenged act would serve the public
interest (e.g., in this case the Act takes control of one-sixth of the U.S. economy by
nationalizing the health care and health insurance industries and the expenditures
of trillions of dollars).
In summary, the Court should deal with this congressionally erected
roadblock for what it is: an attempt to create unconstitutional edifice to judicial
review, which violates both the Doctrine of Separation of Powers and the
Judiciary’s review powers under Article III.
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ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLARE THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ENJOIN ITS ENFORCEMENT
BECAUSE ITS ENACTMENT WAS NOT A PROPER EXERCISE OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
As an initial matter, it is important to focus upon what type of Commerce
Clause power Congress has exercised in the Act. Specifically, the Supreme Court
has articulated three general categories of regulation in which Congress is
authorized to exercise its commerce power: (1) the channels of interstate
commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, though the threat may
come from intrastate activities; and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-559
(1995)(“Lopez”); see, also, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150
(1971)(“Perez”). It is clear from Congress’ own findings in section 1501(a)(as
amended by section 10106(a)) that Congress is neither regulating the channels of
interstate commerce nor the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Accordingly,
the following legal analysis is limited to category three, “substantially affects.”
In recent decisions of the Supreme Court, district and circuit courts have
been instructed that there are limits to the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause to federalize regulation of personal conduct. Starting in Lopez, the Supreme
Court held that Congress has no power to make a federal crime of possessing a
handgun within 1,000 feet of a school, even if the gun had traveled through
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interstate commerce. Lopez, supra, 514 U.S. at 559. Continuing in United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-12, (2000)(“Morrison”), the Supreme Court held that
Congress has no power to fashion a federal remedy for claims of violence against
women. Finally, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that Congress
has no power to make a federal crime of arson, even if the affected building is
subject to a mortgage held by a bank in another state. Jones v. United States, 529
U.S. 848 (2000)(“Jones”).
The issue raised in Lopez was whether the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court
invalidated that act, holding that the legislation did not regulate any economic
activity, nor did it require possession of the gun be involved in any activity in
interstate or intrastate commerce. Lopez, supra, 514 U.S. at 561. Similarly, at issue
in Morrison was whether the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 exceeded
Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. As in Lopez, the Morrison Court found that
an indispensable component of a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause
power is that “the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.”
Morrison, supra, 529 U.S. at 610-611 (emphasis added). In this case, the Act
attempts to regulate inactivity—by definition a non-event cannot be classified in
any respect, let alone as an “economic endeavor.” There is no avoiding it,
Congress is attempting to create a monumental regulatory scheme written into
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existence by 2,559 pages, wherein there is only one section describing the
Commerce Clause trigger: section 1501(a)(2)(A)(as amended by section 10106(a)).
As already stated, that section identifies inactivity as the jurisdictional trigger.
As in this case, Lopez and Morrison were facial challenges to congressional
statutes, wherein the Supreme Court held that the class of activities identified by
Congress were not economic, and, therefore, were not subject to regulation under
Congress’ Commerce Clause power. Contrariwise, in this case the Act does not
identify any class of activities, but rather simply asserts that individuals’ inactivity
is the basis for Congress’ exercise of Commerce Clause power. See, section
1501(a)(2)(A)(as amended by section 10106(a)).
Furthermore, it is important to note that in the foregoing cases, the Supreme
Court imposed stringent limits on Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause
relative to personal conduct. In this case, by way of the Act, Congress is
attempting to impose federal regulation of an individual’s inaction. Suffice it to
say that nowhere in the Constitution is Congress vested with power to mandate that
an individual (such as Baldwin) or entity (such as Pacific Justice) enter into a
contract to purchase a good or service in general, or to purchase health insurance in
particular. No Supreme Court decision or doctrine has ever authorized or upheld
such a claim of congressional power, not even obliquely. Consequently, Congress’
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exercise of power under the Act is not only unprecedented and unauthorized by the
Constitution, but also necessarily foreclosed by Lopez, Morrison, and Jones, supra.
Furthermore, even Members of the New Deal Era Supreme Court would
blush at such an exercise of Congressional power. For example, in National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937) the
Supreme Court acknowledged that there are limits to Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause:
“The authority of the federal government may not be pushed to such
an extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause
itself establishes, between commerce ‘among the several States’ and
the internal concerns of a State. That distinction between what is
national and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital to the
maintenance of our federal system.”
Id. at 30.
It is clear from the plain language of the Act in this case that even Congress
realized that it was regulating inactivity, which was expressed in its findings:
“In the absence of the requirement [i.e., the individual mandate to
purchase health insurance], some individuals would make an
economic decision and financial decision to forego health
insurance coverage…”
See, section 1501(a)(2)(A)(as amended by section 10106(a))(emphasis added).
This constitutes an admission by Congress that it is attempting to regulate
inactivity. Never in the history of the nation has the Commerce Power been
employed in such a manner to require a person who is otherwise inactive to engage
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in economic activity. However, this is the trick being employed: before Congress
can regulate an activity, such activity must already exist; thus, in the Act, Congress
commands all citizens to engage in economic activity (i.e., purchase health
insurance), then Congress regulates that activity. The obvious danger in ratifying
such an exercise of Congressional power is that it would alter the relationship of
the federal government to the states and the people. Moreover, such an alteration to
Article I, § 8 would constitute an amendment to the Constitution in contravention
of Article V; see also, Marbury. 18
Putting aside Lopez, Morrison, and Jones for a moment, the Act still does
not survive even when considering New Deal era and recent 2005 Supreme Court
cases that stretch the limits of the Commerce Clause. For example, in Wickard, the
Supreme Court approved Congress’ regulation of a home farmer’s wheat crop that
was intended for personal consumption and was not intended to be sold. The
Supreme Court concluded that notwithstanding the intrastate nature of his wheat
crop, Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause could still reach this activity:
“’The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation
of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate
which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of
Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to
18 In Marbury, the Congressional act at issue was struck down because it
unconstitutionally expanded the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction in
contravention of Article III, § 2. In this case Congress is attempting to expand its
own power under the Commerce Clause.
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the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the
granted power to regulate interstate commerce. . .’”
Wickard, supra, 317 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added; quoting United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119(1942)(“Wrightwood Dairy”). In quoting
Wrightwood Dairy, the Wickard Court was again acknowledging what has always
been and presently is the case: the Commerce Clause reaches only interstate and
intrastate activity, not inactivity.
More recently, in Raich, the Supreme Court rejected a Commerce Clause
challenge to the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”).19 The CSA regulated
cultivating and possessing home-grown marijuana, even when done so intrastate
and with the sanction of California’s medicinal marijuana law.20 In Raich, the
Supreme Court analogized the cultivating and possession of marijuana with the
home farmer in Wickard:
“Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home
consumption, a fungible commodity for which there is an established,
albeit illegal, interstate market. Just as the Agricultural Adjustment
Act was designed ‘to control the volume [of wheat] moving in
interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses . . .’ and
consequently control the market price, a primary purpose of the CSA
is to control the supply and demand of controlled substances in both
lawful and unlawful drug markets.”
19 84 Stat. 1242, 21 U.S.C. §801 et seq.
20 Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §11362.5.
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Raich, supra, 545 U.S. at 18-19. Furthermore, in footnote 28, the Court sets out
additional activities associated with illegal drug use and trade, which is instructive:
“Even respondents acknowledge the existence of an illicit market in
marijuana; indeed, Raich has personally participated in that market,
and Monson expresses a willingness to do so in the future. App. 59,
74, 87. See also Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511
U.S. 767, 770, 774, n. 12, and 780, n. 17 (1994) (discussing the
‘market value’ of marijuana); id., at 790 (REHNQUIST, C. J.,
dissenting); id., at 792 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting); Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977) (addressing prescription drugs ‘for which
there is both a lawful and an unlawful market’); Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398, 417, n. 33 (1970) (referring to the purchase of
drugs on the ‘retail market’).”
Id. at 18, n. 28.
What is important about Raich is that it clearly articulated the concept of
economic activities, which it defined to include: “the production, distribution,
and consumption of commodities.” Id. at 25. Notice that the Court’s use of these
verbs necessarily requires activity on the part the person being regulated. Here, the
Act does not regulate anything but inaction on the part of citizens. Once the
judiciary accepts this proposition there is no act that Congress could not compel
citizens to do. It turns the Constitution’s limits on federal power into grants of
unlimited power over citizens. In short, it switches the relative positions of the
people with the government: government’s source of authority is no longer
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“derived from the consent of the governed” 21 but from its own interpretation and
application of the Constitution.
Furthermore, what predominates in Wickard and Raich (as well as all other
Commerce Clause cases) is that there is some level of economic activity occurring,
regardless of whether it occurs interstate or intrastate. No such activity is required
under the Act—the only sine qua non to trigger Congress’ regulation is the
inactivity of citizens. A novel concept, but not authorized by any Supreme Court
decision or the Commerce Clause.
What is also unprecedented and a serious concern to liberty is the technique
Congress has employed in the Act in order to invoke its Commerce Clause
jurisdiction. Specifically, in the first instance Congress regulates an individual’s
inactivity by commanding citizens to engage in activity (i.e., to purchase health
care insurance) so that it can subsequently regulate that congressionally created
activity. Essentially, it is Congress (not individuals) who is creating activity and
then regulating that very same activity. This is Congress placing the cart before the
horse, so to speak. What is required in order for there to be a valid exercise of the
Commerce Clause is existing economic activity, which is then subjected to
21 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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regulation by Congress; not congressional creation of activity from inactivity as is
the case with the Act.
Obviously, it is evident from section 1501(b) of the Act that Congress
believes that under the Commerce Clause it has unlimited powers, including
general police powers that are vested in the States. Of course, such exercise of
power by Congress is not authorized under the Commerce Clause. In rejecting the
government’s position that Congress’ reach under the Commerce Clause is
essentially boundless, the Lopez Court was quick to conclude that the Commerce
Clause does not vest Congress with such police powers:
“To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States.”
Lopez, supra, 514 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added). If such a police power were self-
vested in Congress, then the threat to individual liberty would be grave: if one
cannot make one’s own health and medical decisions, one’s own economic
decisions, then liberty has ceased to exist.
Another important point is that in section 1501(b) of the Act (as amended by
section 10106(b)(2)), Congress simply asserts that the individuals’ inactivity “is
commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate
commerce.” This type of boilerplate assertion and recitation of Commerce Clause
jurisdiction was rejected not only by the Supreme Court in Lopez, Morrison, and
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Jones, but circuit courts have expressly rejected this approach of invoking
congressional jurisdiction. Lopez, supra, 514 U.S. at 559; see also, e.g., United
States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1218 (11th Cir.2006)(“where a jurisdictional
element is required, a meaningful one, rather than a ‘pretextual incantation evoking
the phantasm of commerce…’”); United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 632 (10th
Cir.2006)(“a jurisdictional hook restricting the statute to activities that 'have an
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce' .... may establish that the
enactment is in pursuance of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce… [but a]
jurisdictional hook is not, however, a talisman that wards off constitutional
challenges.”); United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2003)(“But we
question whether the mere existence of jurisdictional language purporting to tie
criminal conduct to interstate commerce can satisfactorily establish the required
‘substantial effect…’").
Finally, this Court has recently invalidated an act of Congress on Commerce
Clause grounds. United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.2003)(“McCoy”).
McCoy addressed the issue of whether a pornography statute22 was valid under the
Commerce Clause. Applying Lopez and Morrison, the Ninth Circuit answered this
question in the negative, holding that the Commerce Clause does not reach non-
22 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
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commercial, non-economic individual conduct that is purely intrastate. Id. at
1119- 1123. Precisely in the same way as Wickard, Lopez, Morrison, Jones, and
Raich, what immediately comes to the fore in McCoy is that the Commerce Clause
analysis deals exclusively with activity (not inactivity) in order to decide whether
or not Congress’ exercise of power under the Commerce Clause was constitutional.
In fact, in applying Wickard, Lopez, and Morrison, this Court in McCoy further
focused the issue by making it necessary that the activity sought to be regulated
under the Commerce Clause must be economic activity:
“In both Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court carefully limited the
reach of Wickard, while affirming that decision's continued vitality. In
Lopez, the Court approved of Wickard 's rationale only in relation to
activity the economic nature of which was obvious. 514 U.S. at 558.
Similarly, in Morrison, the Court affirmed that ‘in every case where
we have sustained federal regulation under the aggregation principle
in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the regulated activity was
of an apparent commercial character.’ 529 U.S. at 611 n.4. Indeed,
the Morrison court commented that Wickard represented 'perhaps the
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over
intrastate activity,' involving 'economic activity in a way that the
possession of a gun in a school zone does not.' Id. at 610 (quoting
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560).”
Id. at 1121-1122 (emphasis in original and added).
Finally, in McCoy, this Court has provided clear guidance for district courts
regarding Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it relates to the Act in this case:
Congress’ attempt to regulate inactivity is outside the scope of all Commerce
Clause cases. Accordingly, McCoy constrains this Court to make a finding that the
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Act is unconstitutional because Congress exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause. Id.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT BALDWIN AND PACIFIC
JUSTICE’S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE PROVISION IS JUSTICIABLE UNDER
ARTICLE III
A. STANDING
Before the merits of the case can be addressed, it must be first made clear
that the case at hand satisfies the Constitution’s Article III limits on the jurisdiction
of federal courts. This jurisdiction has been restricted to what is referred to as
“cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, §2. This has been understood by
the Supreme Court to require a showing of three elements.
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact – an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of
some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)(“Lujan”)(citations and
quotations omitted).
The district court concluded that the first element requiring “injury in fact”
was absent in this case, and, more importantly, that the presence or absence of
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injury is irrelevant. In this regard, the district court concluded:
“Plaintiffs…do not allege any particularized injury stemming from the
Act….[A]s to Plaintiff Baldwin, he does not indicate whether he has health
insurance or not. But that is of no moment because, even if he does not
have insurance at this time, he may well satisfy the minimum coverage
provision of the Act by 2014.”
(ER: 4 l. 28 – ER: 5 l. 9) (emphasis added).
Although both conclusions by the district court are addressed here, the effect
of this ruling ultimately takes the issue of injury off the table entirely, as the
district court concedes that it is of no legal consequence relative to its decision. In
doing so, the district court placed its order solely in the realm of the Ripeness
Doctrine under Article III. It must be noted that the district court’s initial
conclusion is based on an improper method of construing facts in a case involving
a motion to dismiss. However, the court’s subsequent conclusion supersedes and
negates its initial finding in a way that is wholly inconsistent with federal law. As
will be discussed below, the ripeness issue concerns itself with the probability of
enforcement rather than the vagaries of life that face Pacific Justice, Baldwin, and
every plaintiff who has ever presented a pre-enforcement challenge to a court.
As the individual mandate provision is fixed in time and certain in
enforcement, this case is clearly justiciable under Article III. Accordingly, this
Court should reverse the district court’s ruling on justiciability and proceed to
address and resolve the constitutional question presented by this case.
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1. BALDWIN AND PACIFIC JUSTICE HAVE PLED APPROPRIATELY TO
SHOW INJURY AS GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF INJURY ARE
ENOUGH IN A MOTION TO DISMISS.
The conclusion by the district court that Baldwin and Pacific Justice failed to
allege a particularized injury ignores the clear implications of the declarations
offered by Baldwin and Pacific Justice, as well as the procedure for assessing facts
in a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court has been clear that general factual
allegations will suffice in a motion to dismiss:
“At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from
defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e]
that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to
support the claim.’”
Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 561, (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 497
U.S. 871, 889 (1990)(“Nat’l Wildlife”).
Indeed, the Act mandates conduct on the part of every citizen in the United
States with precious few exceptions. The mere challenge alone is indicative of
someone claiming injury, (i.e. the desire to not be forced into compliance). The
declarations of both Baldwin and Pacific Justice explicitly state their objections to
complying with the individual mandate. (ER: 57 ll. 9-11 and ER: 62 ll. 4-10).
Baldwin does not want to maintain health care insurance and specifically
states, “I do not consent to being compelled by the Act to maintain health care
insurance because I believe Congress lacks authority under Article I of the
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Constitution to enact such legislation, and therefore, the defendants lack authority
under the Constitution to enforce the Act.” (ER: 62 ll. 4-7).
Implicit in this objection is an array of injuries that should be (and are
required to be under Rule 12(b)) easily inferred from the declarations. The clear
reality is that the individual mandate is effective independent of Baldwin’s
objections and unwillingness to consent. Therefore, its existence leaves only two
options: (1) comply and suffer a restriction of freedom; or (2) refuse compliance
and suffer a penalty. Either of these options results in Baldwin suffering injury
under Article III.
Furthermore, as recognized by courts in both Virginia and Thomas More, the
mandatory requirements of the health care bill, although not going into effect until
the future, quite clearly affect those who oppose it today:
“This provision will compel scores of people who are not currently enrolled
to evaluate and contract for insurance coverage. Individuals currently
insured will be required to be sure that their present plans comply with this
regulatory regimen. Insurance carriers will have to take steps in the near
future to accommodate the influx of new enrollees to public and private
insurance plans. Employers will need to determine if their current insurance
satisfies the statutory requirements.”
Virginia, supra,, 702 F.Supp.2d at 608.
Virginia touches on the injury inherent in the restriction of freedom imposed
by the individual mandate. It is irrelevant whether Baldwin and Pacific Justice are
presently without insurance or whether they intend on being without insurance in
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the future. The key point is their objection to being compelled to prepare for it,
have it, and/or maintain it. One is injured, even if one has insurance, if one is not
free to divest oneself of that insurance without penalty. For this reason, the
government’s infringement on Baldwin and Pacific Justice’s ability to control the
destiny of their own actions clearly constitutes injury.
The district court in Thomas More provides another example of the present
injury facing the opponents of the Act:
“There is nothing improbable about the contention that the Individual
Mandate is causing plaintiffs to feel economic pressure today. In fact, the
proposition that the Individual Mandate leads uninsured individuals to feel
pressure to start saving money today to pay more than $8,000 for insurance,
per year, starting in 2014, is entirely reasonable. Parents wishing to send
their child to college often start saving money for that purpose as soon as the
child is born, even though the expense will not be incurred for eighteen
years. And while such parents may be diligent in their saving, making many
sacrifices along the way, their child might earn a scholarship to college, or
decide to forego higher education, thus rendering the parents' sacrifices
unnecessary. Such outcomes, however, do not diminish the real financial
burden felt by the parents in earlier years.
Thomas More , supra, 2010 WL 3952805, at *4 (citations omitted).
While the declarations may not have risen to a level of specificity that
documented and categorized every possible injury, such a level of specificity is
unnecessary in a motion to dismiss. The objection, although general, was clear and
sufficient enough to “embrace those specific facts necessary to support the claim.”
Nat’l Wildlife, supra, 497 U.S. at 889.
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As for the injuries that will only occur once the individual mandate in the
Act is fully in effect in 2014, even these injuries satisfy the injury requirement,
which dictates that the injury must be “actual” or “imminent.” While 37 months
may to some seem far off, the magnitude of the Act coupled with the certainty of
its enforcement serves to justify the injury as “imminent.” The Court has clarified
the meaning of “imminent” for purposes of Article III:
“Although ‘imminence’ is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot
be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is
not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is
‘certainly impending,’”
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565, n. 2 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
As set forth in greater detail in the Summary of Argument section, supra, the
certainty of the enforcement of the individual mandate is quite clear in this case
and has been recognized by the district courts in Virginia, Thomas More, and
Florida. For example, “Pending the outcome of the numerous legal challenges to
the Act, the imposition of the Individual Mandate is highly probable, as is the
penalty provision.” Thomas More, supra, 2010 WL 3952805, at *5. Similarly,
“Imposition of the individual mandate and penalty… is definitively fixed in time
and impending. And absent action by this court, starting in 2014, the federal
government will begin enforcing it.” Florida, supra, 2010 WL 4010119, at *18. In
Florida, the court went on:
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“Indeed, with respect to the individual mandate in particular, the
defendants concede that it is absolutely necessary for the Act’s
insurance market reforms to work as intended. In fact, they refer to it
as an “essential” part of the Act at least fourteen times in their motion
to dismiss. It will clearly have to be enforced.”
Id. at *22.
The Supreme Court is clear on the issue of imminence. “One does not have
to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the
injury is certainly impending, that is enough.” Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
State of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923). Due to the impending nature of
the harm, the injury requirement has been met.
2. THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING OR NOT NEEDING HEALTH
INSURANCE IN 2014 DOES NOT PRECLUDE BALDWIN OR PACIFIC
JUSTICE’S CHALLENGE BECAUSE A REALISTIC DANGER OF
SUSTAINING A DIRECT INJURY HAS BEEN SHOWN.
The district court concludes that injury is irrelevant because of its ability to
be nullified by a number of possibilities that could occur between now and 2014.
Of Baldwin, the district court comments, “[H]e may take a job that offers health
insurance, or qualify for Medicaid or Medicare, or he may choose to purchase
health insurance before the effective date of the Act.” (E.R. 5 ll. 9-10). This is
true, but irrelevant, as the Supreme Court has held that such hypothetical reasoning
cannot be used in dismissing a case under Article III. Indeed, if district courts
were allowed to use such hypotheticals, no pre-enforcement challenge could ever
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survive as there would always be a conceivable situation in which the threatened
harm may not come to fruition.
The truth is that Baldwin and Pacific Justice need only show “a realistic
danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or
enforcement.” Babbitt v. Farm Workers,442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979). In Florida, the
district court responded to the government’s argument (adopted by the district
court in this case) by finding that such unknown variables do not make injury
uncertain for purposes of Article III:
“That is possible, of course. It is also ‘possible’ that by 2014 either or
both the plaintiffs will no longer be alive, or may at that time fall
within one of the ‘exempt’ categories. Such ‘vagaries’ of life are
always present, in almost every case that involves a pre-enforcement
challenge. If the defendants' position were correct, then courts would
essentially never be able to engage in pre-enforcement review. Indeed,
it is easy to conjure up hypothetical events that could occur to moot a
case or deprive any plaintiff of standing in the future.”
Florida, supra, 2010 WL 4010119 at *19.
There is hardly a better way to put it than expressed in the preceding quote
in Florida. A consistent application of the district court’s reasoning in this case
would result in the end of pre-enforcement challenges altogether. Moreover, to
hold that the court lacks jurisdiction based on such vagaries is inconsistent with
any pre-enforcement challenge that has ever been heard by a federal court. The
permutations of possibilities that could occur between now and 2014 cannot
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undermine the legitimate challenge of the individual mandate provision, the
enforcement of which is fixed and certain.
B. RIPENESS
On the issue of the Ripeness Doctrine under Article III, the litigation of the
constitutional challenges to the individual mandate provision throughout the
country has helped reaffirm the reality that the factual record needs no further
development for the adjudication of the issue before this Court. In order to satisfy
the Ripeness Doctrine, the Court must “evaluate both the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.” Abbott, supra, 387 U.S. at 149. As demonstrated in greater detail
above, the fully developed factual record in this case, coupled with the hardship
that would exist if review were withheld, proves that Baldwin and Pacific Justice’s
challenge to the individual mandate is justiciable under Article III.
When addressing the issue of a pre-enforcement challenge, the Supreme
Court has held that a claim is ripe if there is certitude that enforcement will occur:
“[W]here the inevitability of the operation of a statute against
[plaintiffs] is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable
controversy that there will be a time delay before the dispute
provisions come into effect.”
Blanchette, supra, 419 U.S. at 143.
The Supreme Court has further discussed this issue in Duke Power, where
the Court found the Ripeness Doctrine was not a bar to a pre-enforcement
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challenge, even where no nuclear accident had yet occurred (i.e., it was an
uncertain future event–the same argument rejected in Duke Power is now being
made by the government in the case at Bar). Duke Power, supra, 438 U.S. at 81-
82.
Furthermore, the district court in Florida concluded that a challenge to the
individual mandate provision of the Act is ripe for adjudication and pointed to the
same conclusions reached by the district courts in Virginia and Thomas More:
“The fact that the individual mandate and employer mandate do not
go into effect until 2014 does not mean that they will not be felt in the
immediate or very near future. To be sure, responsible individuals,
businesses, and states will have to start making plans now or very
shortly to comply with the Act's various mandates. Individuals who
are presently insured will have to confirm that their current plans
comply with the Act's requirements and, if not, take appropriate steps
to comply; the uninsured will need to research available insurance
plans, find one that meets their needs, and begin budgeting
accordingly; and employers and states will need to revamp their
healthcare programs to ensure full compliance. I note that at least two
courts considering challenges to the individual mandate have thus
far denied motions to dismiss on standing and ripeness grounds.”
Florida, supra, 2010 WL 4010119, at *22. Only the district court below reached a
different result.
Finally, the emphasis on the issue of ripeness in cases such as these is on the
probability of enforcement rather than the certainty of what will occur in the life of
Baldwin and Pacific Justice between now and 2014.
/////
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III. THIS COURT SHOULD ENJOIN ENFORCEMENT OF THE
ENTIRE ACT BECAUSE THE ACT DOES NOT INCLUDE A
SEVERABILITY CLAUSE
Although the constitutional challenge presented by this case is narrowly
tailored, the impact of the individual mandate provision being held to be
unconstitutional would be so broad that it requires this Court’s immediate attention
and analysis. This is because the Act does not have a severability clause to save the
remaining provisions in the event this Court holds that the individual mandate
provision is unconstitutional.
Absent a severability clause, which would enable the Court to strike down
one provision without impacting the effectiveness of the rest of the Act, the need
for a constitutional determination by this Court of the individual mandate provision
is not only authorized but necessary. The interplay between provisions and the
overall effectiveness of any act of Congress must be determined. For example:
“Congress could not have intended a constitutionally flawed provision
to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the
legislation is incapable of functioning independently.”
Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1978). Furthermore, it must be
determined “whether [after removing the invalid provision] the [remaining] statute
will function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress.” Id. at 685
(original emphasis omitted).
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Two indicators point to the intent of Congress for the Act to be without a
severability clause. First, Congress specifically removed a severability clause
where it had previously existed in an earlier version of the Act. Second, the Act
cannot function properly independent of the individual mandate. For example, in
its findings in support of the Act, Congress argued that provisions that prohibit the
denial of coverage based on preexisting conditions are balanced by the individual
mandate, which will “broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy
individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums.” Section 1501(a)(2)(I) of
the Act (as amended by section 10106(a)).
This expression of Congressional intent demonstrates that the individual
mandate provision is meant to work in concert with and provide the cornerstone of
the rest of the Act and supports the fact that it neither has nor was intended to have
a severability clause. Accordingly, the destiny of the Act itself is inextricably
intertwined with the constitutionality of the individual mandate provision.
In light of the staggering amount of investments of time and money being
made, the restructuring of the health care and health care insurance industries, and
the impact on private employers as a result of passage of the Act, this Court should
enjoin enforcement of the Act in its entirety.
/////
/////
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CONCLUSION
Baldwin and Pacific Justice respectfully request the Court to issue an order:
1. Reversing the district court’s decision;
2. Declaring the individual mandate unconstitutional;
3. Enjoining enforcement the Act in its entirety; and
4. Awarding Baldwin and Pacific Justice their costs and attorneys’ fees
on appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 39 and § 1988(b).
Respectfully submitted,
By: ___/s/ Peter D. Lepiscopo________________
PETER D. LEPISCOPO, C.S.B. #139583
COUNSEL OF RECORD
WILLIAM P. MORROW, C.S.B. #140772
MICHAEL W. HEALY, C.L.S. #21880
JEREMY M. EVANS, C.L.S. #24211
LEPISCOPO & MORROW, LLP
2635 CAMINO DEL RIO SOUTH, SUITE 109
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92108
TELEPHONE: (619) 299-5343
FACSIMILE: (619) 299-4767
e-mail: plepiscopo@ att.net
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS STEVE BALDWIN AND
PACIFIC JUSTICE INSTITUTE
NOVEMBER 24, 2010
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 76 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
-64-
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
Appellant is unaware of any related cases. See Circuit Rule 28-2.6.
By: ___/s/ Peter D. Lepiscopo________________
Peter D. Lepiscopo, Counsel of Record
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 77 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
-65-
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32(A)(7)(C) AND CIRCUIT RULE 32-1
I hereby certify that, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(C) and Ninth
Circuit Rule 32-1, the attached opening brief for appellants is proportionally
spaced, has a typeface of 14 points, and contains 13,960 words, exclusive of
exempted portions.
By: ___/s/ Peter D. Lepiscopo________________
Peter D. Lepiscopo, Counsel of Record
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 78 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
-66-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on November 24, 2010, I electronically filed the
foregoing brief of appellants with the Clerk of the Court for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.
Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the
appellate CM/ECF system and provides them with true and correct copies thereof
on November 24, 2010, to the following person(s) registered with the CM/ECF
system:
ANISHA DASGUPTA, ESQ. Attorneys for Appellees
MARK STERN, ESQ.
BETH BRINKMAN, ESQ.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
950 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W., Room 7533
Washington, DC 20530
Anisha.Dasgupta@usdoj.gov
efile.dkt.civ@usdoj.gov
I certify and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United
States of America and the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on this 24TH day of November, 2010.
By: ___/s/ Peter D. Lepiscopo_________________
Peter D. Lepiscopo, Counsel of Record
Case: 10-56374   11/24/2010   Page: 79 of 79    ID: 7558331   DktEntry: 15
